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Abstract
Limiting global warming to any level requires limiting the total amount of CO2 emissions, or staying
within aCO2 budget. Herewe assess how emissions from short-lived non-CO2 species likemethane,
hydroﬂuorocarbons (HFCs), black-carbon, and sulphates inﬂuence theseCO2 budgets. Our default
case, which assumesmitigation in all sectors and of all gases, results in a CO2 budget between
2011–2100 of 340 PgC for a >66%chance of staying below 2°C, consistent with the assessment of the
Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel onClimate Change. Extreme variations of
air-pollutant emissions fromblack-carbon and sulphates inﬂuence this budget by about ±5%. In the
hypothetical case of nomethane orHFCsmitigation—which is unlikely whenCO2 is stringently
reduced—the budgets would bemuch smaller (40%or up to 60%, respectively). However, assuming
very stringent CH4mitigation as a sensitivity case, CO2 budgets could be 25%higher. A limit on
cumulative CO2 emissions remains critical for temperature targets. Even a 25%higher CO2 budget
stillmeans peaking global emissions in the next two decades, and achieving net zeroCO2 emissions
during the third quarter of the 21st century. The leveragewe have to affect the CO2 budget by targeting
non-CO2 diminishes strongly alongwithCO2mitigation, because these are partly linked through
economic and technological factors.
1. Introduction
A near-linear relationship between cumulative emis-
sions of carbon dioxide (CO2) and peak global-mean
temperature increase is seen in many climate models,
and the ratio between these two quantities is referred
to as the transient climate response to cumulative
emissions of carbon (TCRE). TCRE is deﬁned as the
global-mean surface temperature increase for an
emission of 1000 PgC to the atmosphere, and applies
for cumulative emissions up to about 2000 PgC until
the time temperatures peak (Collins et al 2013). The
Working Group I (WGI) contribution to the Fifth
Assessment Report (AR5) of the Intergovernmental
Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) assesses TCRE to fall
with greater than 66% probability—‘likely’ in the
calibrated uncertainty language of the IPCC (Mastran-
drea et al 2010)—within the range of 0.8–2.5 °C
(Collins et al 2013, Technical Summary in
IPCC2013).
As a consequence of the near-linear relationship
between cumulative carbon emissions and peak tem-
perature, a CO2 budget can be computed that deﬁnes
the emissions compatible with limiting peak warming
to below a given temperature limit with a given prob-
ability. IPCC AR5 WGI computed that to limit CO2-
OPEN ACCESS
RECEIVED
1April 2015
REVISED
4 June 2015
ACCEPTED FOR PUBLICATION
5 June 2015
PUBLISHED
10 July 2015
Content from this work
may be used under the
terms of theCreative
CommonsAttribution 3.0
licence.
Any further distribution of
this workmustmaintain
attribution to the
author(s) and the title of
thework, journal citation
andDOI.
© 2015 IOPPublishing Ltd
inducedwarming to below 2°Cwith at least 33, 50, and
66% probability, the corresponding compatible car-
bon budgets would be 1570, 1210 and 1000 PgC,
respectively8 (Summary for Policymakers in
IPCC 2013). With historical CO2 emissions amount-
ing to about 515 PgC (‘likely’ range 445–585 PgC) by
2011 (Friedlingstein et al 2014, Summary for Policy-
makers in IPCC 2013), this suggests that we have
already emitted about half of the CO2 emissions com-
patible with limiting warming to below 2°C with a
greater than 66% chance. This interpretation would
only be correct for the hypothetical case that all the
warming is caused only byCO2.
Many other, both cooling and warming, species
inﬂuence the radiative balance of the Earth (Myhre
et al 2013). As their resulting effect at the time of zero
CO2 emissions is projected to be net positive (i.e. to be
a net warming effect), compatible CO2 emissions bud-
gets are smaller when taking into account all radia-
tively active species (Collins et al 2013, Clarke
et al 2014, Knutti and Rogelj 2015, Technical Sum-
mary in IPCC 2013). For instance, IPCC AR5 WGI
estimates that compatible CO2 emissions from 2011
onward to limit peak global-mean temperature
increase to below 2°C would be reduced to about 410,
355, and 275 PgC for having at least 33, 50, and 66%
chance, respectively. Likewise, based on the Working
Group III (WGIII) contribution to the IPCC AR5
(Clarke et al 2014, Summary for Policymakers in
IPCC 2014), scenarios that have a ‘likely’ chance of
limiting warming to below 2°C have a range of about
170–320 PgC for CO2 emissions from 2011 to 2100.
This ismuch lower thanwhat would be estimated for a
world in which only CO2-induced warming would
play a role. In other words, half of the CO2 emissions
compatible with limiting warming to below 2°C (with
a greater than 66% chance) have been emitted if we
consider only CO2—taking also the inﬂuence of non-
CO2 species into account, however, about two thirds
of 2°C-compatible CO2 emissions have been emitted
to date.
The level of non-CO2 emissions could thus play an
important role in determining the size of the CO2 bud-
get. Here we explore if, and by howmuch, the targeted
mitigation of various, both cooling and warming,
non-CO2 species would inﬂuence CO2 emissions bud-
gets during the 21st century consistent with limiting
warming to below speciﬁc temperature thresholds.
We explore the potential impact of methane (CH4),
soot (or black carbon—BC), sulphate (SO2), and
hydroﬂuorocarbons (HFCs), and do so by accounting
for possible linkages between sources of emissions of
CO2 and non-CO2 species (see section 2).
Emission mitigation actions discussed in the fra-
mework of the United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) focus on
the so-called Kyoto-basket of greenhouse gases
(GHGs). This basket contains CO2, as well as CH4,
N2O, HFCs, perﬂuorocarbons, sulphur-hexaﬂuoride
(SF6), and nitrogen triﬂuoride (NF3)
(UNFCCC 1998, 2012). Actions to reduce BC and sul-
phates are thus not explicitly pledged under the
UNFCCC. Recently, however, initiatives have been
launched by other forums that focus on limiting so-
called short-lived climate pollutants (SLCPs). These
SLCPs consist of CH4 and HFCs, (both controlled
under the UNFCCC), the tropospheric ozone arising
from CH4, NMVOC, CO and NOx emissions, and BC
(UNEP 2011). The cooling sulphates, although also
being air and climate pollutants, are not considered
under the group of SLCPs.
It is well-established that, unlike for CO2, the
annual rate rather than the cumulative emissions of
SLCPs have the strongest effect on peak warming
(Smith et al 2012, Bowerman et al 2013, Pierre-
humbert 2014, Rogelj et al 2014c). Moreover, despite
not being directly covered by actions undertaken
under the UNFCCC, also some SLCPs (including BC)
will be strongly reduced by mitigation measures to
limit cumulative CO2 emissions (ﬁgure 1; Rogelj
et al 2014b, Rogelj et al 2014c). This is because CO2
and some SLCPs are emitted by common sources. For
example, many combustion processes, like diesel
engines, release both CO2 and BC. If diesel engines are
phased out because CO2 emissions are limited, the BC
emissions that originally originated from these engines
disappear.
2.Methods
Based on an initial scenario set of almost 200 scenarios
(Rogelj et al 2011), we construct a set of cases that
allow an assessment of the inﬂuence of SLCP mitiga-
tion on CO2 budgets. Each of the original scenarios
contains an internally consistent set of both CO2 and
non-CO2 emission trajectories over the 21st century.
We here use a set of earlier published methods (Rogelj
et al 2014b, Rogelj et al 2014c) to recalculate new,
internally consistent baseline emissions for CH4, BC,
co-emitted species like organic carbon (OC), and SO2,
and compare these to stringent emission mitigation
pathways. These new baselines are required to allow an
assessment of themaximum effect of non-CO2mitiga-
tion on CO2 budgets: the difference between a mitiga-
tion path and a baseline in absence of mitigation
targeting a speciﬁc non-CO2 forcer.
CH4, BC, and SO2 are affected differently by CO2
mitigation (ﬁgure 1). For BC, OC, SO2 and other co-
emitted pollutant emissions, we use a tool provided by
Rogelj et al (2014b) that allows to calculate consistent
global relationships between CO2 and these air-pollu-
tion species. Default baseline emissions for these air
pollutants assume that current air-pollution
8
This assumes the 0.8–2.5°C range to approximately correspond to
the one-standard-deviation range (1 sigma or about 68%) of a
normalGaussian distribution.
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legislation is fully implemented and that global air-
quality standards converge in line with regional eco-
nomic development. This baseline also assumes that
with increasing economic development an increas-
ingly larger share of the population will get access to
clean sources of energy (Pachauri et al 2012, Rogelj
et al 2014c). The mitigation path for BC and its co-
emitted species mimics the ‘all measures’ case devel-
oped by the UNEP SLCP report (UNEP 2011) until
2030 and is further projected throughout the century
as described by Rogelj et al (2014c). The mitigation
path for SO2 assumes that stringent air-pollution con-
trols are implemented over the 21st century (see
Rogelj et al 2014b).
Also three alternative baselines are constructed for
a sensitivity analysis: two with air-pollution legislation
frozen at its 2005 levels throughout the 21st century
for BC and SO2/NOx, respectively. In these two base-
lines, no improvements for BC or SO2/NOx air-pollu-
tion legislation are assumed to have occurred over the
last decade and the stringency of air-pollution control
is frozen at its 2005 levels throughout the 21st century
for BC and SO2/NOx, respectively. These assumptions
represent a counterfactual evolution of air-pollution
control over the past decade, and a failure to effectively
implement any additional air-pollution measures in
the future. A third alternative baseline includes no
targeted energy access policies (see table 1 and Rogelj
et al 2014b for details). Under the latter assumption,
large shares of the global population remain without
access to clean energy until the end of the century. The
use of traditional biomass for cooking and heating is
currently a major source of anthropogenic BC emis-
sions globally (Pachauri et al 2012).
For CH4, we follow the method presented in
Rogelj et al (2014c) to create CH4 baselines consistent
with each respective CO2 emission trajectory. This
method applies no common carbon price to CO2 and
CH4, but only to CO2. Because CO2 and CH4 have few
common sources, CH4 baseline emissions do not vary
much across a wide range of CO2 emission pathways
(ﬁgure 1). These CH4 baseline emissions are then
compared to a very stringent CH4 mitigation path,
derived from a model with particularly strong CH4
reduction response to, for example, increasing carbon
prices (van Vuuren et al 2011). Also a case assuming a
20-year delay of these stringent CH4 measures is
constructed.
For HFCs, we use updated HFC baseline estimates
(Velders et al 2009) and assess their inﬂuence relative
to earlier estimates (Nakicenovic and Swart 2000) as
described in Rogelj et al (2014c). These estimates are
the high end of the literature (Gschrey et al 2011).
Figure 1. Schematic representation of trajectories of radiatively active non-CO2 species consistent with various cumulative CO2
emissions over the 21st century.
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The ‘reference case’ of our study includes intern-
ally consistent baseline evolutions for air pollutants
that all follow an extrapolation of current policies, as
well as the original CH4 and HFC pathways from
Rogelj et al (2011). Note that carbon-price or policy
effects are typically included in the CH4 and HFC
‘reference case’ pathways which are found in the litera-
ture. To explore the maximum range, these carbon-
price effects are excluded in our CH4 and HFC base-
lines. However, CH4 baselines still change as a func-
tion of CO2 mitigation, not due to a carbon price but
because some sources of CH4 are phased out together
withCO2mitigation (ﬁgure 1).
Comparing the various baseline, sensitivity and
reference cases will provide us with an estimate of the
potential effects of a set of policy interventions, which
are, however, rarely fully independent from CO2miti-
gation. While BC and SO2 emissions are coupled to
CO2 mitigation by co-emission from economic activ-
ities and technologies, CH4 and HFCs are coupled to
CO2 mitigation by multi-gas carbon-price/policy
effects, resulting from multilateral agreements under
theUNFCCC and/or national policies.
The temperature outcome of each scenario varia-
tion is assessed with the reduced-complexity carbon-
cycle and climate model MAGICC, version 6 (Mein-
shausen et al 2011a), in a probabilistic setup that is
consistent with the IPCC AR5WGI climate sensitivity
assessment (Meinshausen et al 2009, Rogelj et al 2012,
Rogelj et al 2014a). Temperature increase is computed
relative to preindustrial levels (1850–1875). Global-
mean temperature projections and assessing asso-
ciated uncertainties are a key application for which
MAGICC has been extensively vetted (Meinshausen
et al 2011b). For each scenario, the 50%, 66% or other
percentiles are computed out of a sample of 600 cli-
mate model runs; a cubic smoothing spline (smooth-
ing parameter: 5 × 10−9) is computed to show the
general dependence of maximal target temperature
versus cumulative CO2 emissions (ﬁgure 2(A)). Alter-
native appropriate values for either smoothing para-
meter orﬁt type do not change ourmain conclusions.
3. Results
We here look at how CO2 budgets consistent with
limiting warming to below a speciﬁc temperature limit
by 2100 are inﬂuenced by themitigation of short-lived
non-CO2 species. As introduced earlier, to ﬁrst order,
annual emissions of short-lived non-CO2 species
leading up to the time of the peak play the most
important role for peak warming (Smith et al 2012).
Therefore mitigation actions on these species are only
important insofar as they effectively reduce the annual
emission burden of short-lived non-CO2 species
around the time of peak (or maximum) warming
during the 21st century. Inmost temperature stabilisa-
tion scenarios, peak warming is reached by the last
quarter of the 21st century. Scenarios with little CO2
mitigation reach their maximum warming during the
21st century only by 2100, and are still increasing
afterwards. Any scenario that does not reach zero or
lower annual CO2 emissions by 2100, will exhibit
furtherwarming after the 21st century.
Results are reported as relative changes to the
‘reference case’ (tables 1 and 2). Absolute values are
reported in table S1.
Table 1.Overview and description of cases and sensitivity cases assessed in this study. Accompanying references can be found in the
main text.
Case Description
Reference case Casewith internally consistent evolutions of air pollutants at the level of current legislation. This
implies that global air-pollution control converges, alongwith regional economic development, to
current best levels of air-pollution control. Also alongwith regional economic development, rural
populations gradually gain access to clean forms of energy. Reductions inCH4 are driven by the
same carbon price as reductions inCO2.
NoCH4mitigation As reference case, but no carbon-price-induced reductions of CH4. CH4 emissions are only reduced to
a small degree as a result of technical linkages toCO2mitigation (see ﬁgure 1).
Stringent CH4mitigation As reference case, but CH4 emissions follow a very stringentmitigation path (fromRCP2.6) which is
situated at the very low end of theCH4mitigation literature range.
Delayed stringent CH4mitigation As stringent CH4mitigation case, but with a 20-year delay of reduction.
BCmeasures As reference case, but with BC and co-emitted species reduced very stringently, in linewith the ‘all
measures’ case of UNEP/WMO(2011). This impacts emissions fromBC,OC,NMVOC, andCO.
Frozen BCbaseline As reference case, but instead of assuming the level of current legislation, BC and co-emitted species are
subject to air-pollution controls frozen at their 2005 levels throughout the entire 21st century.
No energy access policies As reference case, but instead of assuming no speciﬁc energy access policies at all during the entire 21st
century, resulting in large populations still lacking access to clean sources of energy by the end of the
century.
SO2measures As reference case, but SO2 is subjected to stringent air-pollution controls in the future.
Frozen SO2 andNOx baseline As reference case, but instead of assuming the level of current legislation, SO2 andNOx are subject to
air-pollution controls frozen at their 2005 levels throughout the entire 21st century.
UpdatedHFCprojections As reference case, but with updatedHFCprojections for the 21st centurywhich represent the high-end
of the literature.
4
Environ. Res. Lett. 10 (2015) 075001 J Rogelj et al
Earlier literature has shown that mitigation mea-
sures of BC and its co-emitted species only have a lim-
ited effect on maximum 21st century temperatures
(≪0.1°C) when compared to a baseline which already
includes current and planned legislation (Rogelj
et al 2014c). In the context of this study, this limited
effect on maximum 21st century temperatures trans-
lates into virtually no effect (<2.5%) of ‘BC measures’
on CO2 budgets (ﬁgure 2(B) and table 2, relative shifts
of CO2 budgets are rounded to the nearest 5%). This
limited impact is robust across all temperature levels
assessed here.
These ﬁndings are sensitive to the air-pollutant
baseline evolution. Therefore sensitivity cases were
created (table 1). First, when assuming a baselinewith-
out explicit energy access policies, CO2 budgets
decrease by about 5% for 2°C-compatible budgets
(table 2). For higher temperature levels, this relative
effect becomes smaller. Second, we assume a frozen
BC baseline, representing a roll-back of future air-pol-
lution controls over the 21st century from today’s
levels. In this case, maximum 21st century tempera-
ture is affected by 0–0.4°C, depending on the con-
current CO2 mitigation. This translates in a 0–5%
smaller CO2 budget compatible with 2°C and 3°C, and
5–10% smaller CO2 budgets compatible with 4°C by
2100 (ﬁgure 2(B)). The lower end of these ranges cor-
responds to higher probabilities of limiting warming
to below these temperature levels. This is a logical
result as to achieve higher probabilities of staying
below a given temperature limit, increasingly lower
CO2 pathways are required. A discussion of the
robustness and adequacy of these values is provided in
the following section.
The ‘BC measures’ assumed in the previous
paragraph only tackle sources of air pollutants that
have a net warming effect. However, other air pollu-
tants (like SO2) exist which have a net cooling effect.
SO2 emissions are strongly linked to emissions of CO2,
and in addition, technology shifts lead to a projected
steady phase-out of these emissions over the 21st cen-
tury. Therefore, stringent emission reductions of SO2
are projected to inﬂuence maximum 21st century
warming to a very limited degree compared to our
reference case which includes a ‘current legislation’
baseline, and their inﬂuence on CO2 budgets con-
sistent with particular temperature limits is therefore
assessed to be virtually zero. Assuming that SO2 con-
trols are frozen at their 2005 levels, however, would
increase the CO2 budget for limiting median global-
mean temperature to below 2, 3, and 4°C, by 10, 15,
and 25%, respectively. For higher probabilities, this
effect is smaller (table 2).
In the CH4 pathways of our ‘reference case’ typi-
cally a multi-gas mitigation approach was pursued
(e.g., Clarke et al 2009). This means that CH4, and
other gases of the Kyoto-GHG basket, are targeted
together with CO2 by means of a common carbon
price and ametric translating non-CO2 emissions into
CO2-equivalent emissions (for example, 100-year
Figure 2.Dependence of carbon budgets consistent with a particular temperature limit during the 21st century. Panel A shows the
distribution of global-mean temperature outcomes per scenario and smoothing splines for the outcomes at the 50, 66 and 75%
probability level. Panel B shows how themedian outcomewould changewhen assuming alternativemitigation of non-CO2 air-
pollutant species. Panel B shows smoothing splines for themedium temperature outcome for each case, respectively. The shaded
ranges are visual guides. Note that the full range is to be considered highly hypothetical (see section 4 inmain text).Moreover, only
scenarios with a temperature increase in 2100 of about 2°C and less are stabilizing temperatures by 2100.When year-2100
temperatures are higher, temperatures continue to increase past 2100 and the provided carbon budgets are thus not holdingwarming
to below the here reported year-2100warming in the long term.
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Global-Warming-Potentials, as currently under the
UNFCCC). By contrast, in our baselines for CH4, we
decoupled CH4 fromCO2mitigation by assuming that
the carbon price is only applied to CO2. When switch-
ing CH4 pathways in all scenarios to this hypothetical
baseline, CO2 budgets for limiting warming to speciﬁc
temperature levels during the 21st century are reduced
across all scenarios, but with important variations. For
limiting warming to below 2°C, CO2 budgets con-
sistent with a 50, 66, and 75% chance of success are
reduced by 35, 40, and 50% respectively (table 2). For
higher temperature limits, this change is smaller
(ﬁgure 3(A), table 2), because for higher CO2 budgets
the ‘reference case’ includes higher reference CH4
emissions due to a lower (implied) common carbon-
price pressure in the original scenarios.
Table 2.Carbon budgets between 2011 and 2100 in linewith limitingwarming to speciﬁc temperature limits with a particular probability
level during the 21st century, and their relative changes (rounded to the nearest 5 PgC and nearest 5%). Note that all cases are not equally
plausible across the various temperature levels (see section 4 inmain text). Absolute emission values are in PgC (=GtC). Corresponding
values inGtCO2 are obtained bymultiplying the reported values by a factor of 3.66.Note that only for the 1.5°C and 2°C temperature limits
the results reﬂect the change in peakwarming budgets. For both the 3°C and 4°C limit, CO2 emissions are not at or below zero by 2100 and
temperatures are thus not yet stabilized. In the latter case, the budget shifts are driven by changes in transient warming in 2100 rather than
peakwarming during the 21st century.
Carbon budgets between 2011–2100
Temperature (T) limit relative to preindustrial levels 1.5°C 2°C 3°C 4°C
50% chance of staying belowT limit in 2100
Reference case 130 PgC 460 PgC 1005 PgC 1510 PgC
Relative changes:
NoCH4mitigation ND −35% −15% −5%
Stringent CH4mitigation +75% +20% +20% +25%
Delayed stringent CH4mitigation +55% +15% +15% +25%
BCmeasures +5% 0% 0% 0%
Frozen BCbaseline +10% −5% −5% −10%
No energy access policies −20% −5% −5% 0%
SO2measures 5% 0% −5% −5%
Frozen SO2 andNOx baseline ND 10% 15% 25%
UpdatedHFCprojections ND −20% to−45% −10% to−15% −5% to−10%
66% chance of staying belowT limit in 2100
Reference case ND 340 PgC 870 PgC 1325 PgC
Relative changes:
NoCH4mitigation ND −40% −20% −5%
Stringent CH4mitigation ND +25% +20% +25%
Delayed stringent CH4mitigation ND +20% +15% +20%
BCmeasures ND 0% 0% 0%
Frozen BCbaseline ND 0% −5% −10%
No energy access policies ND −5% 0% 0%
SO2measures ND 0% −5% −5%
Frozen SO2 andNOx baseline ND 5% 15% 20%
UpdatedHFCprojections ND −30% to−60% −10% to−20% −5% to−15%
75% chance of staying belowT limit in 2100
Reference case ND 260 PgC 780 PgC 1210 PgC
Relative changes:
NoCH4mitigation ND −50% −20% −10%
Stringent CH4mitigation ND +35% +15% +20%
Delayed stringent CH4mitigation ND +25% +10% +20%
BCmeasures ND +5% 0% 0%
Frozen BCbaseline ND 0% −5% −5%
No energy access policies ND −5% 0% 0%
SO2measures ND 0% −5% −5%
Frozen SO2 andNOx baseline ND −5% 15% 20%
UpdatedHFCprojections ND ND to−40% −10% to−25% −5% to−15%
COMPARISON
IPCCAR5WGIII table SPM.1
(Summary for Policymakers and chapter 6 in IPCC2014)
‘likely’ (>66%) probability ND 170–320 PgC 170–665 PgC 170–1360 PgC
‘more likely than not’ (>50%) probability ND 260–390 PgC 700–910 PgC ND
‘about as likely as not’ (33–66%) probability ND 270–420 PgC ND ND
ND: no data
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Alternatively, if CH4 pathways are all switched to a
very stringent mitigation path (van Vuuren et al 2011)
CO2 budgets for limiting warming to below 2°C are
increased by 20, 25, and 35%, for achieving a probability
of 50, 66, and 75%, respectively. These relative shifts are
similar forhigher temperature limits, yet become increas-
ingly less plausible (see discussion). When delaying this
shift towards a stringentCH4mitigation path by 20 years,
CO2budgets for 2°Care increasedby about 5% less.
Finally, the high end of recent projections of HFCs
are signiﬁcantly higher than earlier estimates. Not
tackling this projected increase strongly reduces the
CO2 budgets consistent with 50% probability of keep-
ing warming to below 2, 3, and 4°C, by 20–45%,
10–15%, and 5–10%, respectively (table 2,
ﬁgure 3(B)). In some cases, the highest updated HFC
projections would push the achievability of staying
below low temperature levels with high probability (66
or 75%) beyond the here assessed scenario literature.
Given that our HFC assumptions are based on the
highest available literature estimates and also lower—
equally plausible—estimates are available, our results
should also be read as upper-limit estimates.
4.Discussion
4.1. Comparison to IPCCAR5 ranges
To situate our analysis within the wider literature, we
compare our results with the transformation pathway
assessment of the IPCC AR5 (table 6.3 in Clarke
et al 2014). IPCC AR5 WGIII provides ranges of
cumulative CO2 emissions for limiting warming to
speciﬁc temperature levels with a given probability
(table SPM.1 in IPCC 2014). For several temperature-
probability combinations, a comparison with the data
of this study can be made (table 2), which shows that
our results are broadly consistent with the WGIII
scenario assessment of the IPCCAR5.
In our ‘reference case’, limiting warming to below
2°C relative to preindustrial levels with 75, 66, or 50%
chance would imply cumulative carbon emissions
between 2011 and 2100 to be limited to 260, 340, and
460 PgC. This compares to IPCC ranges of assessed
cumulative CO2 emissions over the same period for
limiting warming to below 2°C of 170–320, 260–390,
and 270–420 PgC, for a >66%, >50%, and 33–66%
probability, respectively. Our 2011–2100 CO2 budget
estimates for the higher probabilities (for instance, 340
and 260 PgC for 66% and 75% chance, respectively),
both fall well within the IPCC ranges for a >50% and
>66% probability, respectively. Our estimate for a
>50% probability is slightly larger than the IPCC’s
33–66% range. This is consistent with the under-
standing that the IPCC AR5 WGIII assessment of
transformation pathways does not just use the direct
model output of the MAGICC model but also further
accounts for uncertainties of the temperature projec-
tions which are not covered by climate models (and
which were assessed by WGI). In other words, the
Figure 3.Dependence of carbon budgets consistent with a particular temperature limit during the 21st century. Vertical lines
represent the 5th to 95th percentile range around the ‘reference case’ (see text). Panel A shows how themedian outcomewould change
when assuming alternative levels of CH4mitigation. Panel B shows how themedian outcomewould changewhen taking into account
updated baseline projections forHFCs.Note that accounting for common carbon-price signals already brings our ‘reference case’ at
lowCO2 budgets down towards the stringent CH4 reduction case (panel A), while at high carbon budgets the opposite is true. Not all
cases are equally plausible across the various temperature levels (see section 4 inmain text). Only scenarios with a temperature increase
in 2100 of about 2°C and less are stabilizing temperatures by 2100.When year-2100 temperatures are higher, temperatures continue to
increase past 2100 and the provided carbon budgets are thus not holdingwarming to below the here reported year-2100warming in
the long term.
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IPCC conservatively interpreted the raw output num-
bers of their probabilistic model setup when translat-
ing them into the calibrated IPCC uncertainty
language. This results in budget estimates that tend to
be lower than what would be derived directly from
model output. Finally, also 2011–2100 CO2 budgets
consistent with limiting warming to higher tempera-
ture levels over the 21st century, for example a 3 or 4°C
warming, are found to be consistent with the IPCC—
again, taking into account that the results and num-
bers in this paper reﬂect the direct probabilistic output
of the MAGICC model simulations, while the IPCC
further assessed these probabilities in light of possible
limitations in our current understanding of the cli-
mate response.
4.2. Applicability and limitations
Themagnitude of the effect of non-CO2mitigation on
CO2 emission budgets across 2°C and 4°C scenarios is
strongly affected by the expected baseline range of the
non-CO2 emissions in these scenarios. These emis-
sions may vary to a much larger extent in a 4°C
scenario where CO2 emissions are relatively high by
the end of the century (ﬁgures 2 and 3). This is because
even when not speciﬁcally targeted, non-CO2 emis-
sions can still be reduced by CO2 mitigation. Emis-
sions of air pollutants like BC can be emitted by the
same sources as CO2. Hence, in a world with stringent
CO2 mitigation, air-pollution baseline emissions (in
absence of any targeted air-pollution control) will
already be much lower than in a world with high CO2
emissions (Rogelj et al 2014b). Therefore, measures
that target air-pollution species would allow a larger
absolute amount of air pollution to be removed in a
4°C world compared to a 2°C world, where the
baseline air pollution levels are much lower because
sources commonwithCO2 have been phased out.
Likewise, emissions of CH4 by 2100 would be
much higher in scenarios that reach high end-of-cen-
tury warming, and the effect of policies targeting CH4
speciﬁcally would be larger. This is because of two rea-
sons. First, CH4 emissions are to a limited degree cou-
pled to technologies that also emit CO2, and are thus
slightly reduced through mitigation targeting CO2
only. Second, price signals like carbon prices lead to
CH4 emissions being reduced along with CO2. It is
important to note that the inclusion of this price signal
linkage in our ‘reference case’ pushes CH4 emissions at
low CO2 budgets down towards the stringent CH4
reduction case, while at high carbon budgets a lack of
price signals results in CH4 emissions towards the high
no-mitigation baseline (ﬁgure 3(B)).
Emission (reductions) of CO2 and other species
are often coupled because of physical/technological
links (a certain technology emits both CO2 and a host
of other species), or an economic and policy link (an
entire basket of gases ismade subject to a single carbon
price, e.g. in the UNFCCC). Taking into account these
links, we ﬁnd that the effectiveness of targeting non-
CO2 species individually is reduced in stringent CO2
mitigation scenarios. In other words, initiatives that
target individual species provide less additional bene-
ﬁts (or have a decreased ‘additionality’) when CO2
emissions are stringently reduced. Furthermore, our
results also provide an indication of how much dis-
placement (in terms of cumulative CO2) can be toler-
ated without exhausting the CO2 budget beneﬁts of,
for example, stringent early CH4 abatement (supple-
mentary table 1).
An important limitation of our estimated effects of
non-CO2 mitigation on CO2 budgets is that for tem-
perature levels higher than 2°C, global-mean tempera-
ture is not yet stabilized by 2100, as annual CO2
emissions in 2100 in such scenarios are not yet at or
below zero. Only for the lowest temperature levels
(<2°C), scenarios thus actually represent realistic
pathways towards keeping warming to below the levels
indicated in the long term. For higher temperature
levels, the estimated effects of non-CO2 mitigation are
to be considered transient and impermanent. This also
explains the larger effect of non-CO2 mitigation on
CO2 budgets for higher temperature levels—in some
sense an artefact of the limited time horizon of this
study, which only extends until the end of the 21st cen-
tury. A second aspect, which works in the opposite
direction, is the simple fact that CO2 budgets con-
sistent with higher temperature limits are larger and
absolute changes therefore translate in smaller relative
changes. If the time horizon would extend beyond
2100, the relative inﬂuence of non-CO2 mitigation on
CO2 budgets for temperature limits higher than 2°C is
expected to decline.
Because assumptions of socio-economic scenarios
become increasingly uncertain when going more than
100 years into the future, our analysis is limited to the
21st century and therefore provides results for max-
imum 21st-century warming only. This maximum
21st-century warming either occurs at peak warming
in case of stringent mitigation scenarios which keep
warming to below 2°C, or in 2100 for scenarios that do
not stabilise temperatures during the 21st century.
However, the trade-offs that were quantiﬁed between
CH4 mitigation and CO2 budgets also have to be seen
in a longer-term context. Over longer timescales and
for the same global warming in 2100, cases with larger
CO2 budgets and more stringent CH4 abatement have
more committed, irreversible long-term warming,
than cases with lower CO2 budgets and higher CH4. In
the latter case, the possibility of bringing down tem-
perature by later action on methane beyond 2100 is
left open.
Most of these scenarios assume global mitigation
action to start at a time point that lies in the past (2005
or 2010). Recently, many studies have provided sce-
narios that start mitigation at later points in time and
thus explicitly delay near-term mitigation (Kriegler
et al 2013, Luderer et al 2013, Rogelj et al 2013a, Rogelj
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et al 2013b, Riahi et al 2015, Tavoni et al 2015). While
such delays strongly impact the technology feasibility
and costs of scenarios, as well as transient temperature
levels (Rogelj et al 2013a, Schaeffer et al 2013), the
anticipated impact on CO2 budgets consistent with
limiting warming to below 2°C is anticipated to be
small.
Our cases have been developed to span the widest
range of conceivable sensitivity cases. However, not all
combinations remain equally plausible. For instance,
given the already existing and operational policy instru-
ments under the UNFCCC for mitigating the entire
Kyoto-GHGbasket, it is already counterfactual today to
assume that no CH4 mitigation occurs when CO2 is
reduced. Also for the future, it is thus plausible that CO2
and CH4 mitigation will be linked. Likewise, given that
our assumed CH4 mitigation path is extremely ambi-
tious (Smith and Mizrahi 2013, Rogelj et al 2014c,
Smith et al 2014), it is highly unlikely that it can be
achieved if CO2 emissions rise to levels in line with 3°C
andhigher. Finally, both our sensitivity BCandSO2 fro-
zen legislationbaselines are highly hypothetical. It is dif-
ﬁcult to conceive a future in which local policymakers
strongly target air pollution from soot, but at the same
time keep sulphate controls frozen at historical levels, or
vice versa. As ﬁgure 2(B) indicates, freezing air-pollu-
tion legislation across the board (both BC and SO2)
would result in anoverall cooling.
5. Conclusion
In conclusion, we have quantiﬁed the possible inﬂu-
ence of short-lived non-CO2 mitigation on CO2
budgets consistent with limiting warming to various
levels during the 21st century. The most meaningful
ﬁndings are for 2°C, as for this level temperatures are
actually stabilized by 2100, and peak warming has thus
been reached. Our study looked at warming during the
21st century. If 21st-century reductions of short-lived
climate forcers are traded with reductions in CO2,
warming during the 21st century might be the same,
but the multi-century warming commitment would
still be larger due to larger cumulative CO2 emissions.
We ﬁnd that mitigation of air-pollution species
(both warming and cooling) barely affects consistent
CO2 budgets. That is largely because a phase-out of
CO2 emissions would lead to reductions of co-emitted
emissions as their sources disappear.
Very stringent CH4mitigation canmarkedly inﬂu-
ence 2°C-consistent budgets, at the expense of a higher
post-2100 CO2 warming commitment. However, this
inﬂuence depends strongly on the realism of the very
low CH4 scenario that was used here, or on the hypo-
thetical case in which no CH4 mitigation would be
undertaken at all. Delaying stringent CH4 mitigation
by 20 year still yields a comparably large beneﬁt as
immediate stringent CH4 mitigation. Similarly, upda-
ted HFC baseline projections could trigger substantial
extra warming that would constrain the remaining
CO2 budget. However, for both CH4 and HFCs, miti-
gation options and policy instruments are readily
available.
Although our results indicate relatively large hypo-
thetical variations of the remaining CO2 budget, the
real-world effects of more or less stringent mitigation
action onCH4 are likelymuchmore limited. Thus, our
results can be seen as an exercise to sketch the bound-
aries of the sensitivity. Even in case of very stringent
CH4 mitigation, the CO2 budget’s increase would not
in any way change the fundamental necessity to limit
the cumulative amount of CO2 emissions and hence to
phase-out unabated fossil-fuel emissions to net zero or
below, likely earlier rather than later in the second half
of the 21st century.
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